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More Than Mere Child's Play:
International Parental Abduction of
Children
I read with interest this work on international parental child
abduction which I found to be both thorough and informative.
The problem continues to increase in absence of world-wide
ratification of conventions such as the Hague. Ignorance to the over-
whelming scope and nature of the problem continues to be the big-
gest obstacle to finding solutions. For this reason, I found the work
to be extremely important.
Over the past decade, progress has been made toward solving
the complexity of problems arising from international parental
child abduction. This is evidenced through the creation of the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, The Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1988, the 1979 European Convention, and the
Hague Convention. This examination of the problem is comprehen-
sive in scope while it also explores the existing solutions these laws
and conventions offer. All of this is done in a clear and concise for-
mat which is both informative and useful to parents and assistance
organizations.
I believe we are in a critical time for policy change regarding
international parental child abduction, and I welcome the concern
shown in this paper, as well as the good work.
Foreword by Senator Alan J. Dixon*
* Democrat, Illinois, member, Armed Services, Banking Housing and Urban Affairs,
and Small Business Committees.
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I. Introduction
After or during divorce or separation, it is not uncommon for
children to become the victims of custody disputes between their
parents. The power struggles that follow the deterioration of a mar-
riage often have devastating effects on the children.1 These effects
may be prolonged when, following divorce or separation, the noncus-
todial parent abducts the child in an attempt to gain physical cus-
tody.2 The increasing frequency of such an occurrence has made the
abduction of children by their parents a problem of national3 and
international concern.
This Comment examines both the legal responses of the United
States and international community to this issue. In addition, this
Comment demonstrates the operation of two international conven-
tions that have been designed to address many of the problems tradi-
tionally associated with custody disputes involving the wrongful re-
moval or retention of a child by a noncustodial parent. The final
section of this Comment serves as an advisory tool for parents and
attorneys who are cast into a situation where a child is taken from a
foreign country to the United States or from the United States to a
foreign country. As this Comment reveals, successful litigation of an
international abduction case depends upon a thorough understanding
of the legal mechanisms embodied in current international treaties.
Where no treaty is in force, it is necessary to enlist the assistance of
various legal and governmental organizations that offer services that
respond to problems involving location of an abducted child, deter-
mination of applicable foreign law and obtaining of aid from foreign
counsel.
II. The Development of Parental Child Abduction Law in the
United States
Long before child abduction by a parent emerged as an interna-
tional issue, disputes in the United States arose out of the attempts
of a non-custodial parent to obtain a favorable custody order by tak-
ing the child to another state and seeking relief in its courts. In the
absence of law addressing the issues that accompany such disputes,
1. The California Children of Divorce Project, a five-year study that surveyed immediate
and long-range effects of divorce on American children, reveals that many of the participants
reported that their parents' decision to divorce resulted in a sad and frightening childhood or
adolescence. For a discussion of the results of the study, see C. WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD
AFTER DIVORCE 75-87 (1982).
2. The child's life, as a result of such an event, may be "... continually disrupted or
threatened with disruption as his home, school, friends, and custodial parent change." S. KATZ,
CHILD SNATCHING 11 (1981) [hereinafter KATZ].
3. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Re-
maining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 978, 980 (1977).
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inconsistent practices and decisions prevailed among the states. The
status of the law changed, however, with the enactment of the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).4 Federal legislation,
embodied in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,5 followed the
state legislation. A discussion of the principles and provisions that
these bodies of law contain is necessary for they reappear in current
treaties that respond to disputes in the international realm.
A. Pre-Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
The state of American child custody law prior to 1968 helped
rather than hindered parental efforts to abduct or wrongfully retain
a child.' The abundance of interstate custody cases and the occur-
rence of child snatching before enactment of the UCCJA may be
traced to two factors:' various states possessed jurisdictional stan-
dards that encouraged relitigation of the same case,8 and United
States Supreme Court and state court decisions failed to establish a
full faith and credit or comity standard with regard to original cus-
tody orders.9
1. The jurisdiction factor.-Prior to the adoption of the
UCCJA, state courts could assume jurisdiction over the parties to a
dispute on a number of grounds: physical presence of the child, per-
sonal jurisdiction over both parents, and domicile of the child.1"
These various jurisdictional bases enabled the courts of different
states to assert jurisdiction over the parties. 1 A parent dissatisfied
with the decree of one state court, therefore, could exploit the situa-
tion by removing the child to another state that possessed jurisdic-
tion and possibly would render a more favorable decision. 2
Before the existence of the UCCJA, a state, based upon the
same grounds that established initial jurisdiction, was able to modify
a prior custody decree of a sister state. Mere removal of the child
from one state to another created a sufficient basis for modification
of the decree.13 The latter state, upon the basis of physical presence
4. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT 9 U.L.A. 111 (1968) [hereinafter
UCCJA]. (This was enacted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia.)
5. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568
[hereinafter PKPA].
6. P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN & A. VOLENIK, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 1-1 (1982) [hereinafter HOFF].
7. KATZ, supra note 2, at 34.
8. HOFF, supra note 6, at 3-1.
9. KATZ, supra note 2, at 34.
10. Note, American and International Responses to International Child Abductions, 16
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 415, 419 (1984) [herinafter note].
11. Id.
12. HOFF, supra note 6, at 1-3.
13. Id. at 3-1.
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of the child, could modify the existing decree.
2. The full faith and credit factor.-The full faith and credit
factor 4 is closely linked to the jurisdiction factor. Because state
court and Supreme Court decisions failed to set forth standards that
compel courts to defer to the jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the initial custody decision, state courts freely exercised jurisdiction
regardless of the existence of a prior decree. Having asserted juris-
diction, the courts utilized broad discretion. in refusing to recognize
the determinations of another state or country.
a. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court.-Before the
advent of the UCCJA, the Supreme Court adjudicated four inter-
state custody disputes: People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,15 Kovacs v.
Brewer,"6 May v. Anderson,1 7 and Ford v. Ford.18 Taken together
these cases establish the federal approach 9 to the issue of full faith
and credit for custody decrees.20
14. Under art. IV, § 1, of the U.S. CONST., "... Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State."
15. In the Halvey case, a Florida court granted a divorce and awarded custody of the
child to the mother. Without the consent of the mother, the father removed the child to New
York. The mother instituted habeas corpus proceedings in a New York court, which ordered
that the mother retain custody of the child. The New York decision was affirmed on appeal to
the Appellate Division and to the Court of Appeals. The case reached the Supreme Court on a
petition for a writ of certiorari. 330 U.S. 610 (1953).
16. The Kovacs case involved a situation in which a New York court granted a divorce
and awarded custody of the child to the parental grandfather, pending the father's discharge
from the Navy. The child resided with the grandfather in North Carolina. The mother later
sought, in the New York divorce court, modification of the divorce court's decree and award of
custody of the child. The court modified its decree and granted custody to the mother. Follow-
ing the grandfather's refusal to surrender the child, the mother filed suit in a North Carolina
state court to enforce the custody award. The North Carolina court gave no effect to the New
York decree and found that custody should remain in the grandfather. The decision was af-
firmed on appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of full faith and
credit. 356 U.S. 604 (1957).
17. In May, a father, in a Wisconsin ex parte divorce action, was awarded custody of
the children. The mother refused to deliver to him the children, who were residing with her in
Ohio. Following her refusal, the father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in an Ohio
court. The court ultimately decided that the Wisconsin decree was binding on the mother. The
decision was affirmed on appeal. A later appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
18. Ford concerned a situation in which a father filed a petition for habeas corpus in a
Virginia court requesting that custody of the children, who were residing with the mother in
South Carolina, be awarded to him. Following negotiations, the mother and father agreed to
share custody: the father was to have custody of the children during the school year and the
mother was to have custody during summer vacation and other holidays. Nine months after
dismissal of the case, the mother, while the children were visiting, initiated a suit for full
custody in a South Carolina court. Focusing on the best interests of the children, the court
decided that the mother should have custody of the children. Following appeals to the Court of
Common Pleas and the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the issue of full faith and credit. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
19. This approach has been described as a "hands off" approach. In 1981, however, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a custody suit. For procedural reasons the Court declined
to rule. See KATZ, supra note 2, at 56 and Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981).
20. Id.
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Halvey and Kovacs present the principle that a state's custody
decree is entitled to full faith and credit in a second state only if
jurisdiction was proper and circumstance have not changed such that
a change of custody would be justified.21 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that because state law permits a state to modify its own decree
where circumstances have changed, another state's courts similarly
should be able to modify the decree on the basis of changed circum-
stances.22 Consequently, a dissatisfied parent, to obtain a favorable
decree, simply could go to another state, submit himself or herself to
its jurisdiction, and request modification on the basis of changed cir-
cumstances. The Supreme Court failed to address what constitutes a
change in circumstances, thereby making it relatively easy for a par-
ent to show change.23
The Supreme Court in May grappled with both the full faith
and credit, and jurisdiction issues. Linking the two concepts, the
Court held that where the court's jurisdiction in the original custody
determinations was improper, the decree is not necessarily entitled to
full faith and credit.2" The Court offered various bases for the ra-
tionale of its decision. Justice Burton, who delivered the plurality
opinion, emphasized interstate relationships and the importance of
fulfilling the jurisdictional requirements set out in the opinion.
2
1 Jus-
tice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, stressed the best interests
of the child, and viewed this factor as the primary concern in child
custody disputes. He stated that ". . . the child's welfare in a cus-
tody case has such a claim upon the State that its responsibility is
obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication reflecting an-
other State's discharge of its responsibility at another time."
'26 Jus-
tice Jackson dissented, saying that the Court, by requiring personal
service upon a parent before the domicile state of the other parent
and the child may issue a custody order, creates a state of law
"where possession apparently is not merely nine points of the law but
all of them and self-help the ultimate authority ....
Ford, the final case in the set of major Supreme Court custody
cases, also addressed the issue of full faith and credit. In reaching its
decision as to whether a custody agreement negotiated by parents in
Virginia was binding in South Carolina, the Court considered the
21. Id.
22. See People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. at 614 and Kovacs. v. Brewer, 356
U.S. at 607-08.
23. KATZ, supra note 2, at 56.
24. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. at 533-34.
25. For a more complete discussion of the Court's split on the reasoning of its decision,
see KATZ, supra note 2, at 58.
26. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. at 536.
27. Id. at 539.
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principle of full faith and credit in conjunction with "res judicata."28
According to the Court, unless a custody dispute has been resolved
as a result of adjudication on the merits, the court of another state
seeking to modify the initial custody decree is not bound by the prior
resolution of the factual and legal issues.39
b. Full faith and credit in the state courts
1. Interstate custody disputes.-State court disputes, resolved
in the wake of the Supreme Court decisions, reflected the absence of
a full faith and credit standard. Its absence permitted state courts to
exercise broad discretion in refusing to respect and enforce the cus-
tody decrees of other states."0 Further, state decisions generally pro-
vided that when custody decrees of sister states are recognized, they
can be modified whenever circumstances change. 31
Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard"2 illustrates the way
in which states treated custody decrees of other states prior to adop-
tion of the UCCJA. Following the divorce of her parents, Renee
Thomas remained in the custody of her mother in Philadelphia. Re-
nee's father, without notice to her mother, took Renee to California
to live with him. Following unsuccessful efforts by her mother to
take her back to Philadelphia, Renee was placed in an institution,
pending a child custody decree. A California court awarded the
mother temporary custody of Renee, but later granted full custody
to the father. Disregarding the California order, Renee's mother
took her out of California and returned with her to Philadelphia.
After initiating a custody suit in a Pennsylvania court, Renee's
mother obtained custody of the child. The father appealed to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The court affirmed the lower court's
decision. While the court recognized that Pennsylvania applies a full
faith and credit standard where a sister state has issued a custody
decree, it also stated that if a Pennsylvania court possesses jurisdic-
tion, it may exercise its independent judgment on the same facts that
determined the foreign state's order.33
28. "Res judicata" involves the concept that a matter, once judicially decided, is finally
decided. See Massie v. Paul, 263 Ky. 183, 92 S.W.2d 11, 14.
29. The rationale underlying this decision involves the concern that without a trial on
the merits, a judge may not be able to decide what will safeguard the welfare of the child. See
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. at 193-94.
30. Note, Law and Treaty Responses to International Child Abductions, 20 VA. J. INT'L
L. 669, 677 (1980).
31. In many situations, judges did their best to find that circumstances had changed. See
HOFF, supra note 6, at 419.
32. 203 Pa. Super. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964).
33. The court offered the following factors as support for its decision: I) the Common-
wealth's interest in the child, 2) the welfare of the child, and 3) the fact that custody decrees
are temporary in nature because they are subject to modification where circumstances have
changed. Id. at 99, 198 A.2d at 379.
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2. International custody disputes.-Prior to adoption of the
UCCJA, American state courts accorded as little recognition to the
custody decrees of foreign courts as they did to the decrees of sister
states. 34 Theoretically, the American standard of comity35 governs
the recognition and enforcement of decrees of other countries. This
standard, however, was not utilized in practice, since American
courts often found reasons not to recognize foreign custody decrees. 6
State ex rel. Domico v. Domico3 7 illustrates that prior to adop-
tion of the UCCJA, state courts did not apply comity principles, but
made independent custody determinations based on what they be-
lieved was best for the child.38 Following marital difficulties, a father
removed his two children from West Germany to West Virginia.
Upon discovering this, the mother filed suit in a West German court
to obtain a custody order. The court issued an order awarding cus-
tody of the children to her. Later, divorce proceedings were con-
ducted in Germany and a divorce decree was issued. The mother, in
an effort to gain custody of her children, filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. After exam-
ining the circumstances, the court refused to honor the German de-
cree on the ground that interests related to the welfare of the
children demanded that their father be permitted to retain custody.
39
Multiple jurisdictional bases and the absence of a uniformly ap-
plicable full faith and credit or comity standard combined to create
a favorable environment for forum shopping and child snatching in
interstate and international child custody disputes. These practices
continued until the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Law developed the UCCJA in an attempt to eliminate
them.40
B. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
As revealed by the state of child custody law prior to enactment
of the UCCJA, two factors operated to encourage interstate custody
disputes and child snatching: 1) the exercise of jurisdiction by courts
34. Note, supra note 10, at 420.
35. Comity is defined as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws." 16 Am. Jur. 2d., Conflict of Laws, § 10.
36. Note, supra note 10, at 420.
37. 153 W. Va. 695, 172 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
38. Comment, In Re: International Child Abduction v. Best Interests of the Child:
Comity Should Control, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REv. 353, 360 (1970).
39. The Court emphasized that the children had completely adjusted to life in the
United States, that they were well cared for in an adequate home provided by their father, and
that their father's income was four or five times greater than the income of their mother who
lived in Germany. 153 W. Va. at 704, 172 S.E.2d at 810.
40. Note, supra note 10, at 427.
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of different states which rendered inconsistent decisions and 2) the
failure of courts to grant full faith and credit to original custody
decrees."1 The UCCJA addresses these factors.
1. The jurisdiction factor.-The primary purposes of the
UCCJA is to "avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with
courts of other states in matters of child custody .... "" To accom-
plish this purpose the UCCJA sets forth rules concerning whether a
court has the jurisdiction to hear a custody case and to enter a valid
order and whether a court may exercise that jurisdiction.43
a. Initial jurisdiction.-Before the advent of the UCCJA,
courts typically exercised jurisdiction on the basis of either physical
presence of the child within the state or on the domicile of the child
in the state.4 Enactment of the UCCJA altered prior custody juris-
diction law. The UCCJA produced three major modifications: it
eliminated physical presence of the child as a basis for jurisdiction
except in extraordinary situations,"5 it established "specific and lim-
iting jurisdictional bases for initial decrees "'6 and it set forth addi-
tional jurisdictional limitations for modification of custody decrees.47
The principal "jurisdiction" section of the UCCJA is section
41. KATZ, supra note 2, at 34.
42. Section I of the UCCJA states that the purposes of the Act are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states
in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of
children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a
custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the
interest of the child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child takes place ordi-
narily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connec-
tion and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state de-
cline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer
connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken
to obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state inso-
far as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of
mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states con-
cerned with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
UCCJA, supra note 4, at 116-17.
43. HOFF, supra note 6, at 2-1.
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3,48 which sets forth the "initial" and "modification" jurisdictional
standards that govern a court's ability to enter a custody order.
Under section 3, the primary bases for jurisdiction of a court to
enter an initial custody decree or to modify an existing decree are
"home state" and "significant connections" bases.4 9 The Act vests
initial jurisdiction in the courts in the child's "home state," which is
defined as the "state in which the child immediately preceding the
time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as
parent, for at least six consecutive months .. . ."10 The UCCJA
also vests initial jurisdiction in the courts of a state in which the
child and parent have significant connections. 5 If concurrent juris-
diction results under these bases, sections 6 and 7 provide that courts
are to consider information about any other custody proceedings con-
cerning the same child and, after communicating with each other,
yield to the "appropriate forum." 52
Special circumstances may arise that prevent the application of
48. Section 3 of the UCCJA provides:
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters
has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if:
(I) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of com-
mencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state
within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is
absent from this Sate because of his removal or retention by a person
claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting
as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State
assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and
at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and
(ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has
been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment
or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or dependent]; or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3),
or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the
child, and (iii) it is in the best interests of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical pres-
ence in this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child
custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
UCCJA, supra note 4, at 122-23.
49. Id. at 122.
50. This is the definition presented in § 2(5). See id. at 119.
51. Id. § 3(a)(2), at 122.
52. For a discussion of the principles involved in sections 6 and 7 of the UCCJA, see id.
at 134-35 and 139 (Commissioners' note).
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either home state or significant connections jurisdiction. According
to UCCJA section 3(a)(3), a state must assume jurisdiction when a
child is in need of immediate protection under the circumstances.
This "parens patriae" jurisdiction ". . . exists when a child has been
abandoned and in emergency cases of child neglect."153 Additionally,
section 3(a)(4) provides a subsidiary basis for jurisdiction that a
court may resort to only when no other state can or will exercise
jurisdiction under the other bases."
b. Modification jurisdiction.-Sections 355 and 1 451 of the
UCCJA govern modification jurisdiction. Section 14 provides that if
a court in a state possesses jurisdiction under any of the section 3
requirements and does not decline to exercise jurisdiction to modify
a decree it has previously rendered, other states ". . . shall not mod-
ify . . .57 that decree. Such a provision reinforces the jurisdiction of
the original state to modify the decree and to prohibit other states
from modifying its decree.58
2. Full faith and credit or comity factor.-Although the
terms "full faith and credit" and "comity" do not appear in the text
of the Act, the principles for which they stand pervade the
UCCJA.59 For example, the Commissioners' Note to section 13
states: "Although the full faith and credit clause may perhaps not
require the recognition of out-of-state custody decrees, the states are
free to recognize and enforce them . . . .This section [131 declares
as a matter of state law, that custody decrees of sister states will be
recognized and enforced."6 Under the Act, this treatment of prior
53. Id. at 124 (Commissioners' note).
54. This subsidiary basis of jurisdiction will apply only if the best interest of the child
would be served by the court's assumption of jurisdiction. See id. at 122.
55. Id. at 122-23. See also supra note 48.
56. Section 14 stipulates:
(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this
State shall not modify that decree unless (I) it appears to the court of this State
that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has de-
clined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State
has jurisdiction.
(b) If a court of this State is authorized under subsection (a) and section 8
to modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration to the
transcript of the record and other documents of all previous proceedings submit-
ted to its in accordance with section 22.
Id. at 153-54.
57. Id. at 153.
58. HOFF, supra note 6, at 3-29.
59. KATZ, supra note 2, at 73.
60. UCCJA, supra note 4, at 151.
[Vol. 6:2
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL ABDUCTION
custody decrees is extended to international child custody disputes."'
3. The UCCJ.A and international cases.-Realizing that "...
the basic policies of avoiding jurisdictional conflict and multiple liti-
gation are as strong if not stronger when children are moved . ..
from one country to another by feuding relatives,"6 the Commis-
sioners developed section 2363 of the UCCJA. Through section 23,
the basic principles of the UCCJA are applicable to international
custody disputes and child snatching. 6 Pursuant to UCCJA policies,
thus, American courts have declined to exercise initial and modifica-
tion jurisdiction in various situations.65 For example, where the for-
eign forum had closer connections with the child," American courts
have declined to exercise jurisdiction. Additionally, when the parent
seeking to obtain custody has wrongfully removed the child to the
United States, American courts have deferred to the jurisdiction of
the foreign courts.6 7
While the UCCJA appeared to be the panacea for forum shop-
ping and child snatching by a noncustodial parent, its deterrent ef-
fect was not infallible. Brauch v. Shaw" demonstrates the ineffec-
tiveness of the Act in the context of an international custody dispute.
In the Brauch case, a child was born out of wedlock to Ernest
Brauch and Madeleine Shaw. After his birth, the child lived with
Shaw in England. When the child was nine years old, he visited
Brauch, who lived in the United States. Rather than returning the
child to Shaw, Brauch provided a home for him in the United States.
Shaw, who objected to such an arrangement, commenced legal pro-
ceedings in England to obtain custody of the child. The court made
the child its ward and issued an ex parte ward order. On the same
day that the court issued a second ward order, Brauch filed a peti-
tion for custody in a New Hampshire court. Following hearings, the
61. Id. § 23, at 167-68.
62. Id. "The general policies of this Act extend to the international area." Id. at 167.
63. Section 23 provides:
The general policies of this Act extend to the international areas. The provi-
sions of this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees
of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions
similar in nature to custody institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of
other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all
affected persons.
Id. at 167.
64. Note, supra note 10, at 428. see also Comment, supra note 38, at 362.
65. See also In re Marriage of Ben-Yehoshva, 91 Cal. App. 3d 259, 154 Cal. Rptr. 80
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979) and Woodhouse v. District Court, 196 Colo. 558, 587 P.2d 1199 (1978).
66. Note, supra note 10, at 430.
67. As the Commissioners' Note to section 8 of the UCCJA explains, under the "clean
hands" doctrine incorporated by the section, ". . . courts refuse to assume jurisdiction to reex-
amine an out-of-state custody decree when the petitioner has abducted the child or has en-
gaged in some other objectionable scheme to gain or retain custody in violation of the decree."
UCCJA, supra note 4, at 142.
68. 121 N.H. 562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981).
Winter 1988]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
New Hampshire court awarded temporary custody to Brauch and
his wife. Shaw appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
The court noted that the primary purpose of the UCCJA is to
discourage ". . . both the unilateral removal of a child from his pre-
sent home . . . and relitigation that shifts a child from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction," 9 yet upheld the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction
over the custody dispute. The court rationalized the exercise of juris-
diction on the grounds that the child ". . . would have experienced
the harmful effects of a disputed home environment . . ." o if the
lower court had declined to exercise jurisdiction and the child had
been shifted from New Hampshire to England.
Brauch reveals that broad trial court discretion under the
UCCJA coupled with the absence of the requirement that states au-
tomatically render full faith and credit to existing decrees, dilutes
the deterrent potency of the Act." The second United States at-
tempt to grapple with the problem of parental child snatching - the
Parental Kidnapping Act of 1980 (PKPA) - sought to correct this
and other weaknesses of the UCCJA.
C. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
The second major American effort to reduce the frequency of
abductions in child custody disputes emerged in the form of federal
legislation. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
(PKPA) 72 articulates a purpose, "to deter interstate abductions and
other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
and visitation awards."7 This purpose is reflected in three major
provisions: a full faith and credit provision, a locator service provi-
sion, and a Fugitive Felon Act expansion provision.
69. Id. at 571, 432 A.2d at 6 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 573, 432 A.2d at 7.
71. Comment, supra note 38, at 363-64.
72. PKPA, supra note 5, at 3568.
73. Other purposes of the Act are to:
(1) promote cooperation between State [sic] courts to the end that a deter-
mination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State sic] which can best
decide the case in the interest of the child;
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of
mutual assistance between States [sic] which are concerned with the same child;
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister
States [sic];
(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relation-
ships for the child;
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State [sic] courts
in matters of child custody and visitation which have in the past resulted in the
shifting of children from State [sic] to State [sic] with harmful effects on their
well-being . ...
Id. (Current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1987) (Congressional Findings and
Declaration of Purposes for Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980)).
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Under the full faith and credit provision, the PKPA requires
that a state afford full faith and credit to the custody decree of a
sister state that has met both state and federal jurisdictional crite-
ria.7' Once a custody determination has been made, it may not be
modified unless the original state no longer has, or declines to exer-
cise, jurisdiction and the modifying court possesses jurisdiction."6
Pursuant to the locator service provision, a parent may utilize
the Parent Locator Service76 to locate a child and/or a parent who
has wrongfully taken the child." The PKPA, through the Fugitive
Felon Act expansion provision, offers another source of aid to par-
ents of abducted children. The provision stipulates the congressional
intention to apply the Fugitive Felon Act ". . . to cases involving
parental kidnapping and interstate or international flight to avoid
prosecution under applicable state felony statute. '78  Therefore,
where an "unlawful flight to avoid prosecution" situation arises in
the context of a parental child-stealing case, the investigative re-
sources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may be available. 9
While the PKPA contains several provisions that may assist a
parent whose child has been wrongfully taken, application of these
provisions is confined to cases arising within the United States; the
PKPA is not applicable to international parental abduction disputes.
Consequently, the second major attempt by the United States to de-
ter parental abduction of children fails in the context of international
disputes.
III. International Responses to Parental Abduction of Children
By the 1960's, the judicial authorities in several European coun-
tries realized that it was necessary to develop a set of guidelines that
would assist these countries when they faced international custody
disputes. The 1961 Hague Convention represents the first interna-
tional attempt to respond to this need; however, it also left many
issues unresolved. In 1973, therefore, member nations of the Council
74. The jurisdictional standards of the PKPA are similar to those of the UCCJA, with
one major difference: the PKPA provides that a state decree issued on the basis of "significant
connections" jurisdiction will be enforced only when no state qualifies as a "home state," while
the UCCJA permits the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of either a "home state" or "sig-
nificant connections" status. See PKPA, supra note 5, at 3571 (current version at 23 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738A(C)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987)) and UCCJA, supra note 4, at 122.
75. PKPA, supra note 5, at 3571 (current version at 23 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(West
Supp. 1987)).
76. The Department of Health and Services maintains this service to locate parents who
disobey support orders. Gelman, Child Snatching: The New Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1160 (1981). See also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 653, 663 (West 1983).
77. Id.
78. PKPA, supra note 5, at 3573 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073A (West Supp.
1987). (Parental Kidnapping and Interstate or International Flight to Avoid Prosecution
Under Applicable State Felony Statutes).
79. HOFF, supra note 6, at 8-24.
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of Europe united to create a treaty, The European Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of
Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children,80 which would
respond more completely to the problem associated with interna-
tional custody disputes. Several years later, the combined efforts of
the United States and twenty-two other countries produced The
Hague Convention On The Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction,81 the most recent treaty regarding international child ab-
ductions that occur in the context of custody disputes.
A. The 1961 Hague Convention
Realizing that there was a need to protect the interests of chil-
dren involved in international disputes, several countries82 united to
create the Convention Concerning the Power of Authorities and the
Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants.83 The Con-
vention's stated purpose was "to establish common provisions on the
powers of authorities and the law applicable in respect of the protec-
tion of infants ... ."" Pursuant to this purpose, the Convention
sets forth a jurisdictional standard based on habitual resident8" of
the child. This standard permits authorities of the State of the habit-
ual residence of the child "to take measures directed to the protec-
tion of his person or property.86 While this standard required recog-
nition of the decisions of the state of the child's habitual residence,
inadequacies of the Convention undermined its operation. 87 For ex-
ample, although the Convention provided for recognition of foreign
custody decrees, it did not stipulate that such decrees should be en-
forced.88 Further, any positive effects of the Convention were lim-
80. European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning
Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, May 20, 1980, reproduced in
19 I.L.M. 273 [hereinafter European Convention].
81. Hague Convention On The Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, reproduced in 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
82. Signatories to the 1961 Hague Convention are: Australia, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, and Yugosla-'
via. See Note, supra note 30 at 689.
83. Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Re-
spect of the Protection of Infants, Oct. 5, 1961, U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter Convention for the
Protection of Infants].
84. Id. at 145.
85. "Habitual residence" is equivalent to the American concept of domicile. Reese, The
Hague Draft Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Divorces, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 692, 693
(1967), cited in Foster and Freed, The Hague Draft Convention on Recognition of Foreign
Divorces and Separation, 1 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (1967).
86. Convention for the Protection of Infants, supra note 83, at 145.
87. For example, Article 3 provides that the state of the child's habitual residence shall
recognize a relationship between the child and authority "... which arises from the domestic
law of the State of the infant's nationality." Id. at 147.
88. Jones, Council of Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relating to the Custody of Children, 30 INT'L. & CoMP'v. L.Q. 467, 468 (1981).
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ited, due to the fact that the signatory countries often disregarded
the standards of the Convention and applied their own national
law.89 These deficiencies have caused the Convention to be deemed
"a failure for not dealing at all with abductions of children in viola-
tion of an existing decree."' 90
B. The Strasbourg Convention of 1979
A six-year effort on the part of the European countries consti-
tutes the second international attempt to devise a solution to the
problem of international parental child abduction. 91 The members of
the Council of Europe united to design a European response to the
problem and, in 1979, adopted a final draft, entitled European Con-
vention of Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning
Custody and on Restoration of Custody of Children. 2
1. Return of child and recognition and enforcement of pre-
existing decrees.-The Convention focuses primarily on the im-
proper removal of children. An improper removal under the Conven-
tion is one that is in violation of a pre-existing custody determina-
tion.93 Treatment of such a violation is set forth in two articles that
address the return of an improperly removed child. Article 7 pro-
vides that a pre-existing custody decree of a contracting state "...
shall be recognized and, where it is enforceable in the State of ori-
gin, made enforceable in every other Contracting State [sic]."' Ar-
ticle 8 presents the conditions that must exist before a child will be
returned. First, the state that issued the the prior custody decree
must be the one from which the child and parents derive their na-
tionality. Second, the state must be one in which the child habitually
resides. Last, within six months of the abduction, the parent seeking
custody must submit a request to a central authority."'
2. Central authorities.-To reduce the obstacles that parties
seeking to enforce decisions encounter, the Convention provides for
89. These countries justified their actions on the basis of public policy or the treaty's
emergency exceptions. See Note, supra note 30, at 689.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 690.
92. European Convention, supra note 80.
93. Article I states that improper removal also includes:
i. the failure to return a child across an international frontier at the end of a
period of the exercise of the right of access to this child or at the end of any
other temporary stay in a territory other than that where custody is exercised;
ii. a removal which is subsequently declared unlawful within the meaning of
Article 12.
European Convention, supra note 80, at 274.
94. Id. at 276.
95. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 96-100.
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the creation of central authorities in contracting states.96 The central
authority is a judicial body or an administrative section in a govern-
ment department to which a country delegates the task of reducing
the practical difficulties associated with enforcing custody decrees.97
Its primary role is as a conduit of incoming and outgoing requests
for enforcement of a pre-existing custody determination. 98 The pro-
cess operates such that if a proper request was sent from another
country to a central authority, the authority would submit it to the
proper court for registration.99 If a challenge to registration arises,
the court handles the challenge. If no challenge is raised or if a chal-
lenge is raised but rejected, registration and enforcement of the pre-
existing order would follow. 100
3. Denial of recognition and enforcement of foreign de-
crees.-Article 9 of the Convention provides that recognition and en-
forcement of a foreign decree may be denied under certain circum-
stances.1"' For example, the pre-existing decree will not be
96. Jones, supra note 88, at 470.
97. European Convention, supra note 80, at 274. see also Jones, supra note 88, at 470.
98. Article 3(2) provides that:
the central authorities of the Contracting States:
a. shall secure the transmission of requests for information coming
from competent authorities and relating to legal or factual matters con-
cerning pending proceedings;
b. shall provide each other on request with information about their
law relating to the custody of children and any change in that law;
c. shall keep each other informed of any difficulties likely to arise in
applying the Convention and, as far as possible, eliminate obstacles to its
application.
European Convention, supra note 80, at 274.
99. Jones, supra note 88, at 470.
100. Id. at 471.
101. Article 9 provides:
In cases of improper removal, other than those dealt with in Article [sic] 8,
in which an application has been made to a central authority within a period of
six months from the date of the removal, recognition and enforcement may be
refused only if:
a. in the case of a decision given in the absence of the defendant or
his legal representative, the defendant was not duly served with the docu-
ment which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document in suffi-
cient time to enable him to arrange his defence [sic]; but such a failure to
effect service cannot constitute a ground for refusing recognition or en-
forcement where service was not effected because the defendant con-
cealed his whereabouts from the person who instituted the proceedings in
the State [sic] of origin;
b. in the case of a decision given in the absence of the defendant or
his legal representative, the competence of the authority giving the deci-
sion was not founded:
i. on the habitual residence of the defendant, or
ii. on the last common habitual residence of the child's par-
ents, at least one parent being still habitually resident here, or
iii. on the habitual residence of the child;
c. the decision is incompatible with a decision relating to custody
which became enforceable in the State [sic] addressed before the removal
of the child, unless the child has had his habitual residence in the terri-
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recognized where the defendant in the original custody proceedings
was not notified of the proceedings in time to prepare a proper de-
fense." °2 Neither will the foreign decree be enforced if the "habitual
residence" condition of article 8 is not met. 103 Additionally, "un-
less the child maintained habitual residence in the State [sic] re-
questing enforcement for one year prior to abduction . . ." o, the
state receiving the request will enforce the decree only if the decree
".. . does not conflict with any decisions of the enforcing State [sic]
made prior to the abduction. 1 5
Article 10 presents additional grounds for denying recognition
and enforcement of foreign decisions. 0 6 Among these grounds are
where the circumstances have changed such that return of the child
would be contrary to his welfare, 0 7 where the decision is incompati-
ble with fundamental legal principles by which the enforcing state
abides, 0 1 and where closer connections exist between the child and
the enforcing state than between the child and the requesting
state. 10 9 Pursuant to article 17,110 a state may reserve the right to
utilize any one of the article 10 grounds when confronted with cus-
tody decree cases."'
The Convention responds to many matters" 2 that were obsta-
cles to parents prior to its creation; the limitations and exceptions
contained in articles 7, 8, 9, and 10, however, may undercut the re-
lief which the Convention seeks to offer. Where, for example, a prior
tory of the requesting State [sic] for one year before his removal.
2. Where no application has been made to a central authority, the provisions of
paragraph I of this Article [sic] shall apply equally, if recognition and enforce-
ment are requested within six months from the date of the improper removal.
European Convention, supra.note 80, at 276.
102. Id.
103. Generally, the prior decision must be based upon the habitual residence of the de-
fendant or child. The decision may, however, be founded on the last common habitual resi-
dence of both parents if at least one still lives there. Id.
104. Note, supra note 30, at 691.
105. Id.




110. Article 17 provides that "A Contracting State [sic] may make a reservation that,
in cases covered by Articles [sic] 8 and 9 or either of these Articles [sic], recognition and
enforcement of decisions relating to custody may be refused on such of the grounds provided
under Article [sic] 10 as may be specified in the reservation." European Convention, supra
note 80, at 279.
I11. Jones, supra note 88, at 438.
112. Among these matters are:
(a) the tracing of the child's whereabouts;
(b) the procurement . . . of the services of a lawyer in a second State [sic];
(c) the authentication of the applicant's claim . . .'
(d) the filing of an early date for the giving of a decision; and
(e) procuring the enforcement of a decision when it is rendered.
Id. at 472.
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custody decision does not exist, 1 3 or the nationality or habitual resi-
dence requirement of article 8 is not met,"14 or a development follow-
ing the initial decision has altered the original situation,1 5 the mech-
anisms of the Convention may not be available.
C. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction
Prior to 1976, United States efforts in the area of parental kid-
napping targeted interstate disputes. The United States responded to
public concern over parental abduction with two major bodies of law:
the state-enacted UCCJA116  and the congressionally-enacted
PKPA. 11 Neither of these Acts, however, focused on problems asso-
ciated with international parental abduction. 8 Consequently, a par-
ent whose child was wrongfully removed to or retained in another
country had no choice but to surrender to the applicable laws and
procedures that existed in the country in which the child was
found. 9 This dilemma was recognized at a 1976 Hague Conference
Special Commission meeting, when it was proposed that the Confer-
ence prepare a treaty that addresses parental kidnapping in the in-
ternational realm. 2 In addressing such a problem, the primary ob-
jective was ". . . to spare children the detrimental emotional effects
associated with transnational parental kidnapping."1 21 Thirty-six
countries1 22 participated in an international effort to produce a Con-
vention that would serve to deter international parental abductions
of children and to restore the legal situation to the status quo prior
to the abduction.1 23 By 1980, their combined efforts produced the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction. 24
113. Eekelaar, International Child Abduction by Parents, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 281, 322
(1982) [hereinafter Eekelaar].
114. Id.
115. Jones, supra note 88, at 73.
116. UCCJA, supra note 4.
117. PKPA, supra note 5.
118. Letter of Submittal of Hague Convention to Senate, S. REP. No. 25, 99th Cong.,




122. The nations include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslova-
kia, Denmark, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela, and representa-
tives of the government of Brazil, the Holy See, Hungary, Monaco, Morocco, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and Uruguay participating by invitation or as Observer. Hague
Convention, supra note 81, at 1501.
123. Note, supra note 10, at 440.
124. Eekelaar, supra note 113, at 305.
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The preamble to the Convention reveals the premises upon
which the Convention rests. First, in matters relating to custody, the
interests of children are of paramount importance. Last, in light of
these interests, it is necessary to establish procedures that will ensure
the prompt return of children to the country where they habitually
resided prior to their removal. 8 The Convention sets forth rules
which reflect these premises. Generally, these rules require that a
child who is wrongfully removed to a foreign country or retained
abroad be returned promptly to the country in which he or she habit-
ually resides.
21
1. Scope of Convention.-Under article 1 and 2,127 con-
tracting states are obligated to take appropriate measures to imple-
ment the Convention's objectives as follows: "a) to secure the prompt
return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Con-
tracting State [sic]; and b) to ensure that rights of custody and of
access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States."' 8
Article 3 addresses those removals or retentions that are consid-
ered wrongful for the purpose of the Convention. Under article 3,
removals or retentions that are wrongful are those that are "in
breach of rights of custody," 29 held "either jointly or alone," which
"at the time of removal or retention . ..were actually exercised
... or would have been so exercised but for the removal or
retention."' 30
While the scope of the Convention does encompass children who
are wrongfully removed or retained, it does not extend to all children
who are so victimized.13 ' Before the administrative and judicial
mechanisms of the Convention may be applied, therefore, it is neces-
sary to inquire whether or not the abducted or retained child is sub-
ject to the Convention's provisions.
3
Article 4 provides that the Convention applies to children who
are under the age of sixteen. The Convention cannot be utilized as a
means for securing return of a child once the child reaches six-
teen.1 33 The Convention also provides that the wishes of mature chil-
125. Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1501.
126. Note, supra note 10, at 441.
127. Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1501.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. See also Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International Child
Abduction, 14 FAM. L.Q. 99, 104 (1980) [Bodenheimer].
131. S. REP. No. 25, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
132. This means that "even if a child is under sixteen at the time of the wrongful re-
moval or retention as well as when the Convention is invoked, the Convention ceases to apply
when the child reaches sixteen." Id.
133. Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1501. See also S. REP., supra note 131, at 8.
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dren regarding their return may be considered by the judicial au-
thority. Therefore, although the Convention is applicable because a
child is under sixteen, the judicial authority may refuse to order the
return of the child if he or she ". . objects to being returned and
has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate
to take account of. . . [his or her] views."13' In addition to an age
requirement, article 4 presents a residence requirement. Thus, for
the Convention to apply, the child must have been ". . . habitually
resident in a Contracting State [sic] immediately before any breach
of custody or access of rights." 13 5
Once a child is within the ambit of the Convention, the exis-
tence of a custody order concerning the child cannot withdraw the
protection which it affords."3 6 Article 17'3 7 provides that a state can-
not, on the basis of the existence of a court order awarding custody
to the alleged wrongdoer, refuse to return a child.'
Wrongfully removed or retained children are protected by the
Convention, even in the absence of a prior custody order. To utilize
the return mechanisms of the Convention, one need not show that a
prior custody decree exists.3 9 Invocation of the Convention is per-
mitted in pre-decree situations as well as in the context of abductions
in violation of existing custody decrees.""
2. Administrative assistance: Creation of Central Authori-
ties.-Under article 6, the contracting state is required to designate
a central authority to serve four major functions."' The central au-
thority is empowered to accept and transmit applications for the re-
turn of children, assist in locating children, promote amicable cus-
tody and visitation settlements, and assist applicants in obtaining
legal counsel."' Before legal proceedings are commenced, central
authorities must pursue voluntary return of the wrongfully removed
134. Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1502.
135. Id. at 1501. see also S. REP.., supra note 131, at 103.
136. S. REP., supra note 131, at 13.
137. Article 17 provides:
The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is
entitled to recognition in the requested State [sic] shall not be a ground for
refusing to return a child under this Convention, but the judicial or administra-
tive authorities of the requested State [sic] may take account of the reasons for
that decision in applying this Convention.
Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1503.
138. Id.
139. S. REP., supra note 131, at 13.
140. Id.
141. Bodenheimer, supra note 130, at 105.
142. Article 7 sets forth the specific "appropriate measures" that central authorities are
obligated to take when attempting to secure the return of a child. See Hague Convention,




3. Return of the child.-Once a person's 144 custody rights
have been violated by the wrongful removal or retention of his or her
child by ano ther, 148 he or she may, under articles 8 and 12, exercise
one of two options in order to activate the return mechanisms of the
Convention. 46 First, he or she may apply directly to a court in the
contracting state to which the child has been removed or in which
the child is being retained. Alternatively, he or she may apply to the
central authority of the child's habitual residence or other con-
tracting state where the child is thought or known to be located.
47
If the petition for return is made directly to the judicial author-
ity in the contracting state where the child is located, the court's
function is not to decide who should have custody, but whether there
has been a wrongful removal or retention. 4 8 If there has been such a
breach of rights and return proceedings are commenced less than
one year from the date of wrongful removal or retention, the court is
required to order the immediate return of the child. 49 If, however,
commencement of return proceedings occurs a year or more after the
removal or retention, the court still must order return of the child
unless evidence is presented showing that the child is settled in his or
her new environment. 50
Where a person applies to the central authority of a contracting
state, the authority, upon receipt of such application, may decline to
proceed further if it finds that the application is not within the scope
of the Convention or it is otherwise ill-founded.1 6' If the authority
accepts the application, there are several methods of proceeding. No
matter what method is selected, however, foremost in the mind of
the authority should be the article 10 requirement152 that it "...
take or cause to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain
the voluntary return of the child.' 53
143. Bodenheimer, supra note 130, at 105.
144. The term "person" is used to simplify the discussion of the Convention. The Con-
vention, however, addresses the custody rights of a person, an institution, or any other body.
Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1501.
145. S. REP., supra note 131, at 25.
146. Id. at 26.
147. Id. For a more detailed discussion of these procedures, see Eekelaar, supra note
113, at 316-18.
148. No decision is made on the merits. The court simply determines if there has been a
wrongful removal or retention. See Bodenheimer, supra note 130, at 106.
149. S. REP., supra note 131, at 27. Additionally, Article 11 of the Hague Convention
provides that return proceedings are expected to be completed within six weeks. Hague Con-
vention, supra note 83, at 1502.
150. S. REP., supra note 131, at 27.
151. Eekelaar, supra note 113, at 317.
152. Id.
153. Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1502.
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4. Exceptions to the return requirement.-As mentioned
above, under article 12, where a person has applied to a court in a
contracting state and has initiated return proceedings less than one
year after the wrongful removal or retention, the court shall order
the immediate return of the child.5'6 Articles 13 and 20 recognize
limited exceptions to the article 12 return requirement.65
Article 13 sets forth three bases for refusing to return the child:
1) the person taking care of the child ". . . was not actually exercis-
ing the custody rights at the time of removal . . .," 2) the person
taking care of the child ". . . consented to or subsequently acqui-
esced in the removal or retention . . .," or 3) ". . . there is a grave
risk that . . . [the child's] return would expose the child to physical
or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation."' 6
In addition to the grounds set forth in article 13, under article
20,157 return may be refused if the court finds that return of the
child ". . . would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of
the requested state relating to the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms."' 8
As the preceding discussion indicates, the 1979 European Con-
vention and the 1980 Hague Convention offer relief to victimized
parents by establishing legal mechanisms by which parents may ob-
tain enforcement of a prior custody order and return of an abducted
child. Before seeking recourse through utilization of the Conventions,
however, parents and attorneys must recognize and understand the
limitations and exceptions that exist.
IV. Case Studies: Operation of the 1979 European Convention and
the 1980 Hague Convention
Complete understanding of the legal mechanisms embodied in
the European Convention and the most recent Hague Convention is
best facilitated by application of these Conventions to hypothetical
cases. These cases illuminate pitfalls of both the European and
Hague Conventions.
154. S. REP., supra note 131, at 27.
155. Note, supra note 10, at 443.
156. Article 13 also provides that when the judicial and administrative authorities con-
sider circumstances that may prevent return of the child, they ". . . shall take into account the
information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority
[sic] or other competent authority of the child's habitual residence." Hague Convention, supra
note 181, at 1502-1503.
157. Eekelaar, supra note 113, at 311.
158. Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 1503.
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A. Operation of the European Convention
Assuming that the European Convention is in force, in the first
example two French citizens marry and later reside in France. Dur-
ing their second year of marriage the wife gives birth to a baby boy.
Several year$ later the French couple experience marital difficulties.
Consequently, the marriage deteriorates and the couple obtain a di-
vorce decree from a French court. Pursuant to an accompanying cus-
tody order, the mother retains custody of the son. One year after the
divorce, while the boy is visiting his father, he is moved to Spain.
Application of the Convention's provisions to this situation is
straightforward. France is both the state of nationality of the child
and parents, and the state of the child's habitual residence. Two of
the three conditions necessary to trigger automatic return are there-
fore met.' " To fulfill the final requirement under article 8, the
mother need only submit to the central authority in Spain a request
to enforce the custody decree within six months of the son's re-
moval. 1 0 The central authority then would transmit the request to
the proper court for registration.' 1 After receiving the request the
court would register and enforce the decree. Such enforcement
would compel return of the child. 6
Yet if more complicated circumstances exist the situation under
the Convention is less straightforward. Suppose that the French wo-
man married a Spaniard, not a Frenchman, and that no custody de-
cree exists. As a result of these factual modifications, the French
mother faces a more formidable situation. Automatic return is no
longer a possibility because the nationality requirement is not met. 63
Additionally, the Convention is designed to address post-decree
cases, therefore, before the French woman may utilize the Conven-
tion to secure her son's return, she must obtain a decree or a "chas-
ing order." Such a task may prove to be difficult, if not legally im-
possible to accomplish, because the boy is not present in France.
As demonstrated by these hypothetical cases, the European
Convention is useful where a parent seeks return of an abducted
child under simple circumstances. It is ineffective, however, or even
inaccessible, where complex circumstances arise.
B. Operation of the Hague Convention
In the context of the Hague Convention the following situation
may arise. Two residents of New York marry and settle in the Lake
159. See supra text accompanying note 95.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
162. Id.
163. See supra text and accompanying note 95.
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Placid area of New York. Two years later, they have a daughter.
Subsequently, the marriage becomes unstable and the husband seeks
a divorce. The couple later obtains a divorce decree from a New
York court. Pursuant to the court's determination, the mother re-
tains custody of the daughter. After the divorce, during a visit with
her father, the four-year-old child is taken by her father to Ontario,
Canada.
Under these circumstances, operation of the Hague Convention
is simple. The child falls within the protection afforded by the Con-
vention because the age, wrongful removal or retention, and habitual
residence requirements are fulfilled as follows: 1) the child is under
sixteen years of age, 2) the child's father removed her to Canada in
breach of his access rights and 3) the child was habitually resident
in New York immediately before such breach."" Since the condi-
tions which permit application of the Convention are met, the
mother, to trigger restoration of her child to her custody, either may
apply to the central authority in New York or she may bypass the
central authority and apply directly to a Canadian court. 6
If the mother applies' 6 to the central authority of either coun-
try, the authority, upon receipt of her application, is bound to seek
voluntary return of the child. If these efforts should fail, the author-
ity would institute proceedings for return of the child. If instead, the
mother applies directly to a Canadian court, the court would render
a decision declaring whether or not the removal is wrongful. Where
the removal is declared wrongful, as it should be declared in this
case, the court would order the immediate return of the child."6 7
In contrast to the above factual situation, where the facts are
more complicated, the operation of the Convention is less straight-
forward. For example, assume that rather than seeking a divorce, the
husband agrees to a separation and permits his wife to retain cus-
tody of the child and that after the separation the wife suffers from
depression and becomes careless in her duties as a mother. While the
return requirements remain fulfilled, the fact that the wife has be-
come delinquent in undertaking her responsibilities as a mother may
provide a basis for refusing to return the child. Such refusal is ap-
propriate under the exception that permits refusal where "... there
164. See supra text and accompanying notes 129-35.
165. See supra text and accompanying notes 144-53.
166. The mother must provide the following information:
a/ identity of applicant, child and alleged abductor;
b/ where available, the date of birth of the child;
c/ the grounds on which the claim for return is based; [and]
d/ all available information relating the whereabouts of the child and the
identity of the person with whom the child is presumed to be.
See Eekelaar, supra note 113, at 317.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
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is a grave risk that . . . return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable sit-
uation." 168 Unlike a parent seeking to utilize the European Conven-
tion, however, the mother need not obtain a decree of "chasing or-
der" before seeking relief under the Hague Convention because the
Convention applies equally to pre-decree and post-decree custody
cases.
As revealed by the preceding hypothetical situations, once the
Conventions are fully implemented, they will serve as valuable, but
not infallible, tools to parents seeking enforcement of prior custody
decrees and return of abducted children. Effective utilization of these
tools, however, requires a thorough comprehension of the limitations
and exceptions which accompany their use.
V. Litigating a Foreign Abduction Case: Pitfalls and
Recommendations
The foregoing hypotheticals demonstrate the European and
Hague Conventions in operation. The Conventions are in force, how-
ever, in relatively few countries.169 While international legal mecha-
nisms for obtaining enforcement of a prior custody decree and return
of an abducted child exist, therefore, such mechanisms are impotent
without widespread implementation. Until the European and Hague
Conventions are fully implemented parents and lawyers must rely on
existing law.
170
The successful litigation of an international case involving pa-
rental abduction"' of a child encompasses many issues.1 72 They in-
clude: what law is applicable in the country from which the child
was abducted, how to find and apply foreign law, how to locate for-
eign lawyers, and what legal status is given to foreign custody de-
crees where a prior custody decree is involved.
1 73
168. See supra text accompanying note 156.
169. The European Convention has been ratified by the following countries: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. The Hague Con-
vention has been ratified by the following countries: Australia, Canada (most provinces),
France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United States (with regard to
the United States, legislation aimed at putting in place the Hague Convention-51347-will
be voted upon by the Senate and House of Representatives in late March, 1988. Telephone
interview in March, 1988, with Brian Hanson, Legislative Assistant to Senator Dixon).
Cretney, Child Abduction: the New Law, 130 SoLIC. J. 827, 828 (1986).
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A. When a Child Has Been Taken to the United States: Applica-
ble U.S. Law
All fifty states have adopted the UCCJA, with some varia-
tion. 174  International custody disputes are addressed, under the
UCCJA, through section 23, which provides that the Act's general
policies extend to international cases."7 Where a parent has wrong-
fully taken a child to the United States in order to petition an Amer-
ican court to obtain custody of the child, the aggrieved parent should
invoke section 23 of the UCCJA. Pursuant to the principles of this
UCCJA section, if the foreign forum possesses jurisdiction under its
own law, an American court should defer to such jurisdiction. 76
Further, if the abducting parent is seeking modification of a foreign
custody decree, an American court should decline to exercise juris-
diction where there has been reasonable notice and an opportunity to
be heard in foreign proceedings.17 An additional factor that will
support deference to the foreign forum's original or modification ju-
risdiction is the existence of closer connections between the foreign
forum and the child and his or her parents, than between the United
States and the parties involved.1
78
B. When a Child is Taken to a Foreign Country from the United
States
Fortunately for the parent whose child has been taken by the
noncustodial parent to the United States, the United States possesses
laws 79 that accord recognition to foreign custody orders. This situa-
tion greatly differs, however, when a child is taken to another coun-
try from the United States. Presently, there are no treaties in force
on the topic between the United States and other countries. Recogni-
tion of American custody orders and assistance offered to American
parents, therefore, varies from country to country. 80
Unless the law of the country to which a United States child
has been taken has provided for recognition and enforcement of for-
eign custody decrees,' 8 ' the foreign court will utilize its own substan-
174. See supra text accompanying note 64.
175. Note, supra note 10, at 428.
176. Crouch, supra note 170, at 18.
177. Note, supra note 10, at 429. See the following for custody cases in which American
courts have deferred to the jurisdiction of a foreign forum: In re Marriage of Ben-Yehoshva,
91 Cal. App.3d 259, 154 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) and Woodhouse v. District Court,
196 Colo. 558, 587 P.2d 1199 (1978).
178. UCCJA, supra note 4 at PKPA, supra note 5.
179. Dehart, Getting the Child Back, 9 FAM. ADVoc. 22 (1987) [hereinafter Dehart].
180. A few countries have addressed the issue of the recognition that should be given to
foreign custody decrees. For example, France and Hungary have instructed their courts to
recognize and enforce the decrees of the United States that have adopted a variation of the
UCCJA that includes section 23, the foreign applicability section. See id. at 22.
181. Crouch, supra note 170, at 18.
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tive and procedural law when resolving a custody dispute, even if
both parents are United States citizens.' 82 If a parent is fortunate,
the foreign court may decline to apply foreign law on the basis that
the dispute could best be resolved according to the law of the parties'
own American domicile. 183 Where this does not occur, it may be ar-
gued that the foreign country may recognize an order of a United
States court under the concept of de facto reciprocity.184 Such a con-
cept provides that the United States order will be recognized if an
order from the foreign country would be enforced in the United
States. 85 De facto reciprocity may be established through the use of
section 23 of the UCCJA. Legal counsel, however, must bring an
action to establish such judgment.'
The concept of comity 87 provides an alternative basis for recog-
nition and enforcement of an existing foreign custody decree. 188 It is
likely, however, that a foreign court which claims that it will afford
great deference to the American decree, actually will examine the
facts of the case independently. 8 9 In the majority of cases, therefore,
foreign law will be applied.
1. Finding applicable foreign law.-Where foreign law will be
applied, locating the applicable law may pose a problem. 90 U.S. at-
torneys should seek the assistance of the various legal divisions of the
Library of Congress when trying to determine the nature of the for-
eign law. Another source of applicable foreign law is the foreign fo-
rum's embassy or consulate.' 9 ' These sources provide assistance in
obtaining research services and/or copies of relevant statutes.
2. Locating foreign attorneys.-Another possible problem, in
litigating is enlisting the aid of foreign counsel. A United States ser-
vice that provides assistance to persons trying to locate foreign attor-
neys is the Office of Citizens Consular Services.'92 Other possible
sources of help include: the International Bar Association, 9 3 the In-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Dehart, supra note 180, at 23.
185. Id.
186. Id. See also Nichols, Recognition and Enforcement: American Courts Look at
Foreign Decrees 9 FAM. ADVOC. 9 (1987).
187. Dehart, supra note 180, at 23.
188. Crouch, supra note 170, at 18.
189. Such a problem is intensified when the foreign country has a federal system in
which the law concerning custody matters varies among its states or provinces. Id.
190. Id.
191. To obtain a list of foreign attorneys, contact the Office of Citizens Consular Ser-
vices, State Dept., Rm. 4817 N.S., Washington, D.C. 20520.
192. International Bar Association: 2 Harewood PI., Hanover Square, London WIR
2HB, England.
193. Inter-American Bar Association: 1889 F Street, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20006.
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ter-American Bar Association,194 and the International Society of
Family Law. 1 " Where the testimony or affidavit of a foreign attor-
ney is necessary to explain the United States decree or to confirm its
validity, embassies and consulates may be able to offer assistance. 6
3. Locating the abducted child.-A parent often does not
know the location of the child. Once again, the Office of Citizens
Consular Services provides assistance to the aggrieved parent. Based
upon information 9 7 provided by a parent, a consular officer may lo-
cate the abducted child. 98 If search efforts are futile, the consular
officer will seek verification of the child's entry and residence in a
foreign country.' 99 When such information has been verified the con-
sular officer, with the permission of the United States parent, will
attempt to contact the child.2"'
4. "Re-snatching" the Child.-Utilization of self-help mea-
sures to regain custody of the child is not advisable. The conse-
quences may be severe: a parent attempting to "re-snatch" the child
may be arrested or the child's life may be endangered. 01 In addition,
once the parent regains custody following a re-snatching attempt,
the United States embassy or consulate can offer neither assistance
nor refuge to a parent who, by such action, violates local law. 2'
5. Steps to Deter Abduction.-As demonstrated by the pre-
ceding discussion, until the Hague Convention is ratified by the
United States and United States parents may utilize it, obtaining the
return of an abducted child may prove to be a formidable task. Steps
may be taken in advance, however, to deter abduction by a noncus-
todial parent. For example, the attorney handling the original cus-
tody dispute should ensure that the custody order precludes removal
of the child from the United States and stipulates that such removal
constitutes contempt, a crime for which the abducting parent may be
194. International Society of Family Law: Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge CB3 ODG,
England.
195. For example, embassies and consulates may obtain for an attorney an authoritative
official translation of the decree. Crouch, supra note 170, at 18.
196. Among useful pieces of information are:
. . . the child's name, date, and place of birth; the child's passport number
and ate and place of issuance; the abducting parent's name (and any alias), date
and place of birth; the abducting parent's passport number and date and place of
issuance; and the probable date of departure from the United States and entry
into the foreign country, including flight information.
Gaw, When Uncle Sam Needs to Come to the Rescue 9 FAM. ADVOC. 24, 26 (1987).
197. Id.
198. Photographs of the child and/or abducting parent may assist the local authorities
in their attempt to locate the abducted child. Id. at 27.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 27.
201. Id.
202. Dehart, supra note 180, at 23.
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imprisoned. Additionally, the order should direct the noncustodial
parent to carry out one or more of the following steps before visita-
tion: 1) surrender to the court all passports during visitation, confirm
that he or she holds no other passport, and certify that he or she will
not attempt to replace the passports; 2) deposit with the court any
passport that he or she holds for the child and certify that he or she
will not obtain a replacement; 3) post a substantial bond conditioned
upon timely restoration of the child to the custody of the other par-
ent.2 03 The attorney also should encourage the custodial parent to do
one or more of the following: 1) request cancellation of the child's
United States passport; 2) contact the State Department and request
that it provide notification upon receipt of a request for replacement
of the child's passport, and send a certified copy of the court order to
the Department; 3) send to the United States embassy of the non-
custodial parent's home country a certified copy of the court order
and request that no passport or visa be issued to the child.2"4
Although the Hague Convention of 1980 is not yet accessible to
United States parents due to pending legislation regarding the de-
positing of instruments, a parent and his or her attorney may take
steps to deter abduction by the noncustodial parent and, once an ab-
duction has occurred, to find the child, determine the applicable law,
and obtain assistance of foreign counsel. In addition, various agen-
cies and organizations offer services that facilitate the resolution of
international custody disputes involving United States parents and
children.
VI. Conclusion
United States law and international law, as reflected in the
UCCJA, the 1979 European Convention, and the Hague Convention
of 1980, have evolved in response to the predominant issues arising
from international custody disputes involving wrongful removal or
retention of a child by a noncustodial parent. As a result of this
evolution, legal mechanisms now exist for obtaining enforcement of a
prior foreign custody decree and return of an abducted child. Unfor-
tunately, in several countries such mechanisms are unavailable due
to pending implementation. Until the treaties that hold these mecha-
nisms are widely implemented, parents must grapple with existing
law. In the interim, parents may combat the threat of abduction by
utilizing deterrent measures and, when such a threat becomes a real-
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that provide services related to locating an abducted child, determin-
ing applicable foreign law, and obtaining the aid of foreign counsel.
Elizabeth C. McDonald
